Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
WISP 2019 Proceedings

Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and
Privacy (SIGSEC)

12-15-2019

A theory on information security: A pilot study
Craig A. Horne
The University of Melbourne, craig@informationalrisk.com

Sean B. Maynard
The University of Melbourne

Atif Ahmad
The University of Melbourne

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2019

Recommended Citation
Horne, Craig A.; Maynard, Sean B.; and Ahmad, Atif, "A theory on information security: A pilot study"
(2019). WISP 2019 Proceedings. 5.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2019/5

This material is brought to you by the Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) at AIS
Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in WISP 2019 Proceedings by an authorized
administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Horne et al.

Theory on InfoSec Pilot Study

A Theory on Information Security: A Pilot Study
Craig A. Horne1
School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne,
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Sean B. Maynard
School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne,
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Atif Ahmad
School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne,
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
ABSTRACT
This paper2 extends a proposed theory on information security using pilot data to further
refine and elaborate. We argue that the goal of information security is imperfectly understood
and aim to bring about an altered understanding of why efforts are made to engage in
information security. The goal of information security is widely recognized as the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information however we argue that the goal is
actually to create business resources. This paper responds to calls for more theory in information
systems and challenges our thinking. In a phenomenological grounded theory study, this paper
identifies the core concepts of information security, and describes the relationships between
these concepts. The paper provides the theoretical base for understanding why information is
protected, in addition to theoretical and practical implications, and future research suggestions.
Keywords: Information security, resources, controls, threats, theory development.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the practice of information security being very well established, the theoretical
goals and motivations behind it are imperfectly understood. The emphasis for this paper is to
explain the information security concepts and relationships between them in order to alter our
understanding of why organisations protect information. The current paucity of good quality
theories in the information systems domain leads to calls for development of our ‘own’ theory
(Markus and Saunders 2007; Weber 2003; Weber 2012).
More specifically, this paper is motivated by an apparent gap in the literature where a
theory on information security is not apparent to explain why organisations secure their
information. A search of the academic literature, as described in the next section, does not reveal
any literature that purports to offer a theory on information security. This gap however is not
because information security is uninteresting. Every organisation requires information to
function and disruption to information from a security breach can often lead to disruption of an
organisation’s operations (Cavusoglu et al. 2004). Therefore, filling this gap will make a
valuable contribution to the body of knowledge.
The aim of this research is to increase understanding about why organisations invest in
information security. The scope of this paper includes analysing information security as defined
in the information systems literature and experienced within Australian-headquartered
organisations. We gain an understanding of the phenomena under investigation from 10
individuals who are accountable or responsible for securing information within their respective
organisations, and who have personal experience with information security.
The paper proceeds in five major sections. After this introductory section, the next
section reviews definitions of information security, examines gaps in existing theory, and
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describes the research methodology. Third, we describe findings from the data. Fourth, we refine
our proposed theory on information security. Finally, we draw conclusions, consider limitations
and offer proposals for future research to improve our theoretical understanding of information
security.
REVIEW – WHAT IS INFORMATION SECURITY?
This review section considers varying definitions of information security, and then
reviews the theoretical literature for related theories. The result is a set of gaps and problem
conditions that this research looks to fulfil.
Defining Information Security
This section documents the definition and goal for each of computer security, information
security and cyber security. Computer security, also known as information and communication
technology (ICT) security, is the security of the computers that process and store information
(Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal of computer security is the confidentiality,
integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information
resources (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Information security used to be purely technical,
however has evolved over time to keep pace with changes to computers and networks (Von
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal of information security involves preserving the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of business information (McCumber 1991; Posthumus
and Von Solms 2004). As well, the goal of information security is to safeguard business
continuity and reduce business impairment by constraining the effect of security incidents (Von
Solms 1998). In another contribution the goal of information security was stated to be
confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation of information (Siponen and OinasKukkonen 2007). Cyber security is different to information security (Von Solms and Van
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Niekerk 2013). Although they are very different, the term cyber security seems to be used
interchangeably with the term information security in academic literature (Von Solms and Van
Niekerk 2013). Cyber security transcends the boundaries of information security to include the
defence of information and also people (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal and
general security objectives of cyber security are the availability, integrity and confidentiality of
an organisation’s assets including networks, infrastructure, information and personnel (Von
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).
Examining the above, we see that there are three different definitions for each of
computer security, information security and cyber security but that their goals seem to be
roughly similar, in that they are internally-focussed and revolve around confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. This homogeneity of goals is incongruous given the disparity in definitions.
Theoretical Background
The role of prior theory and theoretical frameworks can be useful in qualitative studies
and sensitivity to these can help identify key concepts that have been previously discovered or
help inform the choice of methodology to be used in the study (Corbin and Strauss 2008;
Wiesche et al. 2017). When examining a web-based resource that lists 104 theories which are
commonly used in information systems, including theories originating from other disciplines,
there are some extant theories related to information security (Larsen and Eargle 2018). For
example, the Theory of Information Warfare presents a model of information warfare in terms of
four main elements: information resources, players, offensive operations, and defensive
operations (Denning 1999). The Theory of Protection Motivation predicts users’ intentions to
protect themselves after receiving fear-arousing recommendations (Rogers 1975). There are few
theories that relate specifically to information security, leading to a narrow definition.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This information security research falls within the domain of information systems, which
has been defined and explained as a system composed of people and computers that processes or
interprets information, and is the view adopted in this paper (D'Atri et al. 2008). It involves
people protecting information that resides on computers, which are all common elements
consistent with information systems. From an information systems viewpoint, information
security is concerned with protecting information (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). The type
of theory expounded in this paper is explanatory in nature, and theories of this nature are often
associated with research in the interpretivist paradigm (Gregor 2006). In this research, a
combination of methodologies is used, which include a phenomenological approach to the type
of data collected and a grounded theory approach to data collection and analysis. Grounded
theory is flexible and can be combined with other methodologies (Urquhart and Fernandez
2013). The phenomenology methodology puts the focus on understanding the lived experiences
of the research participants and the grounded theory aspects guide the techniques for data
collection, analysis, and presentation.
The primary method selected was interviews, long enough to investigate the topic in
depth, lasting ~45 minutes, which were audio-recorded and transcribed (Polkinghorne 1989). An
interview protocol was developed and can be viewed in Appendix 1: Interview Protocol. The
interviews were semi-structured with a set of questions to guide the interview, however
interesting answers were investigated further with unstructured follow-up questions. Data
analysis began immediately after the first interview was completed, to identify related concepts
and begin refining interview questions for the next interview (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Glaser
and Strauss 1967). Open coding of the primary data to break them up into concepts according to
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ideas or themes related to the subject matter was followed by axial coding to relate concepts with
other concepts to create categories (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Wiesche
et al. 2017). During data analysis, questioning and constant comparison techniques were mainly
used and supplemented by other techniques such as flip-flop, personal experiences, identifying
red flags, emotions and time (Corbin and Strauss 2008).
FINDINGS
The aim of this section is to describe the findings after analysis of the data, providing a
rich description of the concept of information security, analysed for its properties and
dimensions, noting any variations throughout. After the data were analysed, the analyses were
aggregated into categories, integrated, and interpreted in relation to the overall research (Corbin
and Strauss 2008). Table 1 lists 10 research participants who were accountable for information
security in their organisations.
Table 1. Data Collection Phase Sample – Organization Demographics
Participant

Industry

1 FedGov2

Government

2 FinCo2

Finance

3 ITCo3

ICT

4 ITCo4

ICT

5 FedGov3

Government

6 TelCo1

Telecom

7 EnerCo1

Energy

8 AvCo1

Aviation

9 MgtCo2

Consulting

10 FinCo3

Finance

Size*
Very
Large
Very
Large
Medium
Very
Large
Very
Large
Very
Large
Very
Large
Very
Large
Very
Large
Very
Large

Job
Title
Dir ICT
Sec
Head
InfoSec
CEO

Quals

Certificates Experience

None

None

6 years

BMath

CISSP

22 years

BCom

CISSP

18 years

CSO

MCM

CISM

16 years

Cyber
Policy

BA

None

4 years

CSO

MBA

None

5 years

CISO

MBA

None

20 years

CISO

None

CISSP

25 years

Partner

MBA
MIT

11+

18 years

Head
InfoSec

MBA

SABSA

15 years

*Small= 1-20 employees, Medium= 21-100, Large= 101-1,000, Very Large= 1,001+
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Information
Information is a core category at the heart of information security, that has several
properties and dimensions for each. MgtCo2 stated “we are pushing toward a data-centric
approach to security, because … we believe that [organisations] can then decide where they
want to spend the money.” The four main concepts related to information that emerged from the
data were accessing the functionality provided by information, controlling and securing
information, information as an asset, and information value.
Information has a value, which is one of its properties. In terms of dimensions, research
participants did not universally agree on how to precisely measure the value of information other
than to say it was generally high, even to the point of being irreplaceable such as proprietary
intellectual property, or it was low. Information was then used as an asset to achieve business
goals. As AvCo1 shared,
“We use something called most valuable information. You’re probably familiar with the
term crown jewels. With any company, there’s always a set of what you call mission critical
assets and that can be a set of IT applications or information database or whatever. You’ve got
mission critical assets that without them, the company would either cease to function or even go
out of business if they were compromised or unavailable in some way.”
Information value can also change over time, typically decreasing. FedGov2 confirmed,
“90 percent of the data that sits within our data holdings is probably short-term or volatile data.
It's good for a point in time, and then after that it becomes historical.” Organisation may take an
active approach to deciding whether to hold valuable information internally or not. FedGov2
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offered “it's around setting your information strategy about what's the important data, what are
your high-value assets, and how much do you want to protect them?”
Normally, most organisations identify their information, assess its value, and then assign
a classification to it. FedGov2 stated, “It’s not just the classification that determines how we
store and handle our information, it’s the value.”
Controls
Information is classified based on its value and then these classifications drive which
controls are applied to the information to secure it. FinCo3 stated, “those labels on those
documents … drive a differential application of security controls. So, things that aren’t very
sensitive, we don’t put as much energy into securing them as we do those things that are very
sensitive.”
Identification of irreplaceable high value information has implications for the storage of
that information, as organisations wanted to maintain complete control over it, reducing the risk
of its loss as low as possible. ITCo4 confirmed “The highly-sensitive trade secret type
information is generally kept on isolated systems within our corporate environment.”
Interestingly however, organisations sometimes mix high and low value information
together when storing it, either through accident or convenience, which may waste money on
unnecessarily expensive controls. ITCo4 commented,
“Traditionally, organisations, particularly the on-premise environments, don't make any
distinction [between high and low value data] and that's a part of the problem. So, they use really
expensive hardware and services, and they just store all their data together.”
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Getting it right however results in a business benefit, which is the conservation of
security budget so that more financial resources are available to protect high-value information
with better quality security controls. TelCo1 clarified, “By categorising the information, you can
actually get bang for your buck. You can put the right security controls around the [information]
that matters. … Which one are you going to protect?”
Goals
When questioned about what the goal of information security was, research participants
sometimes stated the obvious, which was the goal is to keep information secure. AvCo1 for
example, stated “the goal of information security in an organisation is, obviously, the CIA,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets. That’s the key goal.”
Goals often interrelated and supported each other however. Interestingly, the goal of
information security was not always viewed however as simply keeping information secure. In a
variation of this concept, the goal of information security was sometimes perceived as supporting
the organisation in achieving its organisational goals. FinCo2 stated that the goal of information
security was to “protect the operation of the organisation. Make sure the organisation is able to
operate safely”. ITCo4 commented “The goal of information security is to enable the business to
achieve its outcomes in a secure and managed way.” MgtCo2 thought the goal of information
security was “to help the organisation accelerate its growth in a secure manner.”
Organisations instead sometimes viewed keeping information secure as the goal of
implementing security controls. ITCo4 offered “the goal of security controls is to be able to
technically implement control over the information that you are going to produce, generate,
disseminate, and store in various locations.”

Proceedings of the 14th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Munich, December 15, 2019.

9

Horne et al.

Theory on InfoSec Pilot Study

Threats
One key property of organisations is their ability to conduct effective information
security, with dimensions ranging from ineffective to effective. Information can never be
perfectly secure due to the existence of unknown threats. Zero-day exploits, which are newlydiscovered vulnerabilities that could be used to conduct an attack, serve to highlight the
existence of unknown persistent threats. An organisation’s inability to perfectly convert
unknown threats into known threats affects confidence levels in its security leaders, and TelCo1
believed organisations need to take a pragmatic approach to balancing security needs with
business decisions, explaining “Take a balanced approach on a commercial basis … you can’t
be a security purist because you might as well shut the shop and lock the doors and walk away.”
Threats are mostly known so can be prevented, but there are some threats that are
unknown. Information is generally stored in known repositories within the organisation however
some valuable information is unknowingly stored together with non-valuable information,
making it vulnerable. Also, security controls are generally selected and implemented according
to sound heuristics and frameworks, however their effectiveness is unknown, given threat actors
routinely impair their functionality. So, some threats are unknown, some valuable information is
unknown, and the effectiveness of security controls is unknown. These three areas of uncertainty
combined make it impossible for information security to be completely effective. ITCo3
continued with an example serving to highlight the problem with measuring information
security, stating,
“As an example, people often bandy around spam numbers. We blocked 600 email-based
attacks this month, and then next month you say we blocked 700 attacks this month. Great, is
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that a good trend, or is that a bad trend? Then the next month you block 400 attacks. Does that
mean you’re blocking fewer attacks or there were fewer attacks and you blocked just as many of
them? And is that something that you’ve actually affected, or is that just a random variation in
attackers going after whoever they’re going after?”
The volume of unknown threat vectors might be small but they’re still there. Therefore,
organisations cannot claim to have 100% protected their information. The clear majority of
potential attacks can be identified so preventative security controls can be implemented to
mitigate the risk of an attack. FedGov3 confirmed “these days, you can never know whether
something is completely safe or not, but you can have a clear indication.”
Organisations did not raise or lower the value of the information dynamically in response
to threats, but it’s possible that they should be, according to MgtCo2 who stated, “in my personal
experience, they’re not that mature”.
Resources
Organisational productivity can be negatively affected in the event of a security breach,
as employee resources are often redeployed internally to remediate the situation. FinCo2
explained, stating,
“Productivity. If we had a serious incident, there’s a serious breach, we would end up
assigning a significant workforce to work out what happened, and respond and recover from that
sort of activity, and that would require engagement of media outlets, our regulators, our
technology teams, our business teams to go and talk to customers. It would be a massive hit on
productivity. Instead of working on new things, we would basically go into holding pattern for a
period of time while we suffer the storm.”
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EnerCo1 identified that various resources can have their productivity affected, not just
employees, such as their manufacturing plants, stating,
“I’d say generation sites is probably the big thing. I suppose … if [Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition] SCADA systems got ransomwared … stopping our manufacturing plants,
where we manufacture electricity, that’s a big thing.”
The loss of trade secrets or IP can lead to a loss of competitive advantage and market
position, through leakage of trade secrets to competitors or a decrease in revenue. MgtCo2 gave
an example, stating,
“For example, if there is a data breach … in the mining sector, information around their
digging, their next geospatial data, where the next multiple years of millions of dollars of mining
revenues are going to come from then, yes, it does have an impact.”
FedGov2 experienced the effects of organisations losing trade secrets to well-prepared
competitors, stating, “We’ve certainly seen in the past, organisations who've suffered some sort
of breach, lose a lot of business to a competitor who’s got a rock-solid security model.”
A THEORY ON INFORMATION SECURITY
A theory can be defined as “a statement of relations among concepts within a boundary
set of assumptions and constraints” (Bacharach 1989, pp. 496). We argue that information
security needs its own distinct goal, not just to replicate the goal of computer security. We
deconstruct the proposed theory on information security into its various concepts, and the
relationships between the concepts.
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Theory Overview
Information security is a process where people and organisations attempt to create
sustainably-viable resources, from information. They apply suitable controls to protect
information from threats, according to the goals of the organisation, which results in sustainable
resources. Controls are applied to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
information. Information security focusses on what protection is afforded to information of
varying value and what use that protected information can then offer organisations.
Theory Type
A taxonomy of theory types articulates five categorisations: analysis, explanation,
prediction, explanation and prediction, and design and action (Gregor 2006). This theory
embodies the second type: a theory which provides “an explanation of how, why, and when
things happened” (Gregor 2006, pp. 619).
Theories for explanation are described as an ideal type of theoretical contribution (Rivard
2014). Pure theory papers with explanations of theoretical mechanisms are welcomed as essays
with highly valued characteristics (Markus and Saunders 2007). Other researchers have posited
theories which are explanatory in nature without testable propositions (Orlikowski and Robey
1991). The writing of a paper where the end product is purely the advancement of a new theory
via a detailed explanation is perfectly acceptable (Walsham 1995).
Assumptions
Clarifying the assumptions of information security is important otherwise there is a risk
of inappropriate use of the construct. This would then adversely affect construct validity and
potentially the cumulative research tradition (Roberts et al. 2012). First, information security
depends on a completed information classification assessment. Second, an organisation’s
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information security depends on the security budget. Third, information security depends on an
organisation’s ability to match controls with threats.
Structural Components
There are various taxonomies of theory structure with one example describing the parts
as being constructs, associations, states, events, and the whole theory as having importance,
novelty, parsimony, level and falsifiability (Weber 2012). The structure used in this paper
however is based on the “structural components of theory” (Gregor 2006, pp. 620). It includes
means of representation, the constructs which together form the nomological net, the
relationships between the constructs and the scope. Care is also taken to explain why some
theory components were not applicable, such as causal explanations, testable propositions and
prescriptive statements.
Means of representation
This theory on information security must be represented physically (Gregor 2006). Figure
1 shows the constructs included in this theory on information security and the relationships
between them.

Figure 1. Layout of Figures and Captions for Figures
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Constructs
The nomological network is comprised of key constructs: information, controls, threats
and resources. The following section describes each in turn and ascribes meaning to each.
Information: Information is seen as amorphous and can be printed on paper, stored on
computers, sent by post or electronically, shown on videos and articulated in a discussion (Von
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). As well as being stored on physical media such as paper and
digital media such as computers, information can also reside on cognitive media, i.e. people’s
minds (Ahmad et al. 2005). Information can also have various levels of sensitivity, is difficult to
control which sometimes results in leakage, and is intangible in nature (Ahmad et al. 2005).
Information however is not data, with the distinction being that data are raw facts and
information is processed data that is meaningful (McKinney Jr and Yoos 2010). It is interesting
to note that information hosted in the cloud brings its own set of challenges including (1) longterm viability, where information restoration becomes doubtful should the cloud vendor become
bankrupt, and (2) information availability, where cloud vendors may not restore to a different
environment should the information become unavailable (Catteddu 2010).
Information has some attributes including sensitivity and level of analysis. Non-sensitive
information can be unclassified or if sensitive, classified as PROTECTED, CONFIDENTIAL,
SECRET or TOP SECRET. This classification is then used as a basis for allocating access rights
to organisational staff (Ahmad et al. 2014). Information is created and used at all levels of
analysis within an organisation at varying sensitivities and Table 2 provides examples of each:
Table 2. Examples of Organisational Information and Level of Analysis
Level of Analysis

Non-sensitive Information

Sensitive Information

Individual

Desk phone number

Passwords

Group

Department name

Customer sales list

Organisational

Website URL

Trade secrets
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Inter-organisational

Purchase order number

Sales contract pricing

Controls: Organisational security controls (or countermeasures) are defined as an appropriate
mix of physical, technical or operational security controls. The goal of controls is to mitigate the
risks to information (Posthumus and Von Solms 2004). Controls are used to protect information
by reducing the risk posed by exposures or vulnerabilities arising from threats (Von Solms and
Van Niekerk 2013). A strong set of protective controls can provide an organisation with an
effective defence capability and an organisation’s capabilities provide the best defence against
the existing array of competitive forces (Porter 1980).
Controls stipulated by standards are intended to prevent and detect attacks from threats,
primarily through the use of technical, formal, and informal controls. Technical controls are the
computer-based countermeasures. Formal controls are the policies, procedures, and rules that
direct staff. Informal controls refer to the development of a security culture and the provisioning
of education, training and awareness programs (Beebe and Rao 2010).
Threats: There are many threats to the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of
organisational information along with many countermeasures (Workman et al. 2008). Threats to
information systems security include unauthorised access, changing of information, and the
destruction of protective infrastructure that helps preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the information (Workman et al. 2008). Various threats persistently target
exposures or vulnerabilities and ultimately have an adverse impact on information (Beebe and
Rao 2010; Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).
Resources: Resources have been defined as “inputs into the production process- they are the
basic unit of analysis. The individual resources of the firm include items of capital equipment,
skills of employees, patents, brand names, finance” (Grant 1991, pp. 118). Grant (1991) then

Proceedings of the 14th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Munich, December 15, 2019.

16

Horne et al.

Theory on InfoSec Pilot Study

continues that the organisation should then inventory the available resources and assess them for
value generation, before developing a strategy to maximise the value from each one.
A competing view on business strategy defines resources as comprising all assets,
capabilities, processes, information and knowledge (Barney 1991). Resources have also been
defined as strengths that the organisation can use to formulate and implement their strategies
(Porter 1981).
Information resources are crucial to supporting organisational performance by providing
prospects for the establishment of competitive advantage and as such, preservation of
information-based, intangible resources is a significant imperative for organisations (Porter and
Millar 1985; Teece 2000). For the financial returns to an organisation to be sustainable, the
resources that support them must also be sustainable (Grant 1991). The longevity of the of an
organisation’s competitive advantage also depends on the speed at which its supporting resources
degrade (Grant 1991).
A key point is that information already exists, so it is disingenuous to suggest that
protecting it creates an entirely new entity. What does happen however is that by protecting
information with controls, it becomes a robust, ruggedised resource, resilient to threats. This
resource can then be relied upon and trusted by the organisation to not degrade over time and
provide the same utility now as in 20 years.
Statements of relationship
This section describes the relationships between constructs which can be variously
described as associative, compositional, directional or causal (Gregor 2006). The nature of the
theory described in this paper means that the relationships are described succinctly but clearly
and carefully.
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R1 – Relationship between Information and Resources: Information has been conceptualised as
amorphous and intangible, with varying degrees of sensitivity, various storage platforms and
varying levels of analysis. Resources have been conceptualised as information-based,
sustainable, traceable, durable and able to be assessed for potential use in driving competitive
advantage. When information is converted into a resource, there are many inferences for the final
form that it takes, and the following is a discussion of them.
The cause of information being converted into resources is the application of protective
controls. When these controls are applied, the resulting resources cease to be amorphous and
intangible because they can now be recorded in an asset tracking register. The storage platform
may also change due to access restrictions placed on the new resource. Two attributes will
remain consistent however, which are sensitivity and level of analysis. The only potential
changes may be that sensitivity is upgraded once maximum value is assessed and level of
analysis may change once the resource is made available for use throughout the organisation.
The creation of a robust resource through the application of security controls to information is
consistent with the definitions of a resource being sustainable and durable.
R2 – Relationship between Controls and Information: Controls positively cause information to
be protected. Controls have been defined as being formal, informal or technical and all three
forms can be applied to information that resides on physical, digital and cognitive media. For
example, with information that resides on physical media such as paper, a formal control might
take the form of message handling procedures that dictate how the page is to be marked with a
classification indicating the sensitivity of the information and also dissemination limiting
markers. An informal control might include training on how to mark the paper accordingly. A
technical control might be a filing cabinet that the paper can be stored in.
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R3 – Relationship between Threats and Information: Threats negatively cause information to
become degraded. Threats intend to degrade the integrity, confidentiality and availability of
information, with some threats being known and some unknown. Threats are persistent
(Baskerville 2005). The implication of this is that information will always be degraded over time
if there are no controls. Even if there are protective security controls, if we accept that some
threats are unknown (i.e. dynamic, unique, targeted, customised), then the controls won’t defend
effectively against some threats and information will be degraded.
Scope
Abstracting ideas to a higher level and generalising about a phenomenon, its interactions
and the degree of causality are at the heart of theory development (Gregor 2006). The scope of a
theory is described by the generalisability of the construct relationships using modal qualifiers
(for example some or all) and explanations about boundaries (Gregor 2006).
In this theory on information security, a statement on the modal qualifiers used to
describe the relationship between controls and threats is: Some information is protected by some
controls to produce all resources. An implication of this statement is that if information has not
been protected by a control, then it cannot be considered a resource. Another is that all
information to be used for organisational purposes is to be protected.
CONCLUSION
This paper offers a strong rationalisation for why the conceptualisations developed in this
research have advanced our collective understanding of the information security phenomenon.
Based on our review, no theory on information security was apparent in the literature and this
paper now offers one. Our proposed theory on information security states that the goal focussing
all attempts by an organisation to secure information against threats is to create resources that
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can then later be used for organisational performance. The confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information is the goal of controls, not information security.
There are various implications of the research model and these can be separated into both
research and practice areas (Zmud 1998). Implications for theoretical research include the
possible linking of this theory on information security with the theory on internal analysis, which
considers the use of resources to be fundamental to the creation and protection of competitive
advantage. Implications for practice include ideas for the situational contexts where information
security would be most applicable (Zmud 1998). Practical ways that this theory on information
security can make an impact include indicating the need for better identification and
management of resource and controls.
Limitations of Research into Information Security
There are limitations on our perception of information security theory, some of which
follow. First, information security has been conceptualised in various forms, including as a
process (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013), and as a capability and a framework (Siponen and
Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). These raise concerns around construct validity issues, as adhering to one
conceptualisation risks marginalising another. Second, this information security theory can be
applied at various levels. Third, there does not seem to be a way to measure when information
has been protected enough by controls and can therefore be deemed a resource. If this knowledge
could be developed, ‘minimum-viable resource’ criteria could be developed.
Future Research Directions
The following are suggested research directions for information security theory
development, with these directions being adapted from Zmud (1998). First, the theory presented
in this paper can be refuted by developing alternative new theories on information security,
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hopefully stimulating intellectual debate on the nature of information security. Second, existing
theories from reference disciplines could be applied to information security. From sociology,
how could Conflict Theory, which focuses on competition (threats?) to resources (information?)
and the inherent iniquity afforded some units (organisations?) in society, be adapted to
information security? From economics, how could the Pareto Principle Theory (the 80/20 rule)
be adapted to the application of expensive controls in information security? Third, improvements
to the theory described in this manuscript and its use could be further developed.
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
This list of interview questions following the introductory demographic questions about the
participant’s background and organisational attributes:
a. What is the goal of information security?
b. How important is information to an organisation?
c. How can information become unusable over time?
d. How do threats affect an organisation’s information?
e. How do security controls affect an organisation’s information?
f. What is the goal of implementing security controls?
f.a. If participant offers the same answer as (a) goal of information security, then why?
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